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Commentary
When One-Eyed Accountants are Kings: A Primer
on Microeconomics, Income Taxes, and the

Shibboleth of Efficiency*
Richard A. Westin**
The field of federal tax policy increasingly has become a
battleground for the self-proclaimed forces of tax equity and
those of efficiency.1 For the purpose of tax policy, "tax equity"
has been formalized and neatly divided into a set of principles
and a baffling question concerning the appropriate level of
progressivity,2 whereas "efficiency" is used promiscuously and
practically never defined. Perhaps the meaning of "efficiency"
is considered obvious, or perhaps the concept is considered so
obscure that only economists can organize it. Whatever the
reason, the term is used loosely and deserves to be clarified, or
reclarified, for those concerned with matters of federal tax policy, especially for those with limited backgrounds in economics.

The purposes of this brief, nontechnical Commentary are to describe what microeconomists mean by the term "efficiency," to
comment on the force of that concept, and to fathom some of
* © 1985 by Richard A. Westin and THE MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
FOUNDATION. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
1. See, eg., Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Teory: Do MisallocationsDrive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979) (comparing
the approaches of equity theorists and efficiency theorists). I most gratefully
acknowledge the direction provided by Professor Bittker in reviewing an early
and rather cumbersome draft of this Article. I also wish to thank Stephen W.
Salant, Ph.D., of the Rand Corporation, an outstanding microeconomist, for his
invaluable contributions. For a particularly lucid article on public policy issues
presented by equity and efficiency, see Okun, Further Thoughts on Equality
and Efficiency, in INCOME REDISTRMUTION 13, 19-30 (C.Campbell ed. 1977).
2. The well-accepted theorems are vertical equity, the notion that those
with comparatively greater ability to pay should pay more than those less able
to do so, and horizontal equity, the notion that those with equal actual abilities
to pay should pay equally. For a refined definition of horizontal equity, under
which the aim would be to assure that the utility ranking of different taxpayers is preserved when the tax rules are changed, see Feldstein, Compensation
in Tax Reform, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 123, 124 (1976)
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its implications. One of the implications is that the concepts of
efficiency and equity are in fact deeply intertwined.
POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS OF EFFICIENCY: LAW
PROFESSORS AND IDEOLOGUES
There is a rather long list of concepts that are commonly
thought of as "efficiency" but that, as the term is defined by
microeconomists, are not. The first of these alternate uses of
"efficiency" is popular with law professors, who use the term in
analyzing whether statutory provisions organize the revenue
leakage they produce in a sensible manner. This analysis asks
first the purpose of a particular feature of the statute and then
whether the legislature chose the least wasteful means to that
end.3 For example, section 168 of the Internal Revenue Code
4
grants an eighteen-year write-off for improved real estate.
The provision was enacted as part of an overall program of economic recovery,5 but, asks the law professor, is it not true that
waving a magic wand over realty that was in existence on the
date of enactment will do nothing to add to the nation's stock
of improved real estate and will provide no jobs? Accordingly,
has not the legislature caused a purposeless leakage of revenue,
that is, been inefficient? In the language of legislators, has not
the statute been poorly "targeted?" 6 For the law professor,
then, efficiency is equated with sensible organization of revenue leakage.
At a somewhat more sophisticated level, the term "efficiency" is used in examining whether revenue losses have been
sensibly distributed among the persons whose taxes were re3. No disparagement is intended, as the exercise can be highly revealing.
For an especially good example, see Auerbach, The New Economics of Accelerated Depreciation, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1327, 1346-48 (1982), which demonstrates
that, assuming a 12% discount rate, the combined forces of accelerated cost recovery and the investment tax credit, I.R.C. § 38 (CCH 1984), result in a negative tax rate and a major bias in favor of short-lived property. See also Hulten
& Robertson, CorporateTax Policy and Economic Growth: An Analysis of the
1981 and 1982 Tax Acts (Discussion Paper, Urban Institute, Dec. 1982).
4. See I.R.C. § 168(b)(2) (CCH 1984).
5. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984)
(codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
6. The same inquisitorial approach may be aptly applied to I.R.C. § 911
(1982), which grants a lavish exclusion from gross income for overseas occupations. Students will readily agree that the provision may be appropriate for a
United States corporation competing for Middle East construction contracts,
but entirely inappropriate for United States citizens comfortably employed as
bankers in foreign jurisdictions with little or no income tax at the time § 911
was enacted.
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duced. Comparisons between the somewhat stingy tax benefits
available for research and experimentation expenditures7 and
the benefits conferred on used real estate8 furnish a good example. Although Congress has declared its preference for encouraging research and development,9 the tax code encourages
futile investment in used real estate and consequently less investment in research. The statutory provisions are therefore
declared "inefficient." The analysis is similar to that described
above, but the focus here is on evaluating differential revenue
leakage in light of announced congressional policy.
The same type of analysis can be applied to taxes imposed
on different sources of revenue. A typical inquiry is whether
income from capital should be more favorably taxed than income from labor in order to encourage entrepreneurial behavior that provides employment and increases industrial output.
Again, the focus is on whether the statute, as interpreted by
the courts and the government, is crafted to do its intended job.
The other group that uses the term "efficiency" in an alternate sense might be classed as the antigovernment ideologues,
who view any tampering with the marketplace as inexorably
producing "inefficiency." They view the Internal Revenue
Code as an inexcusable petri dish filled with toxic colonies of
governmental intervention. Looking at the Code in this light,
as an exception to an undiluted marketplace, examples of inefficiency abound. For example, the investment tax credit is inefficient because it discriminates in favor of tangible personal
property rather than realty and intangible property. 10 Tax-free
municipal bonds" are inefficient because they drive capital into
otherwise marginally productive uses. To the ideologues, virtually every Code section is a candidate for repeal. This last view
of efficiency seems to be a cross between a reductionist understanding of microeconomics and a preference for social Darwinism. Such language is the province of politicians and the press,
not scrupulous economists.
7. See LIC. § 30 (CCH 1984).

8. See I.I.C. § 168 (1982).
9. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (legislative history of
I.R.C. § 174, which allows deductions for research and development
expenditures).
10. See I.lC. §§ 38, 46-48 (1982).

11. See I.R.C. § 103 (1982).
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THE MICROECONOMISTS' VIEW OF EFFICIENCY
Mficroeconomists occupy a rarified world of elegant models
of economic behavior and alone among economists have a specific understanding of what efficiency represents.
Aicroeconomists try to distill the study of resources and human
preferences into a manageable form by using models, typically
involving small numbers of imaginary participants, from which
certain significant generalizations can be drawn. The result of
their labors is an intellectually coherent system of economic
principles. Such clarity, however, has its cost: all too often, the
models lack any significant contact with day-to-day reality.
BASIc MICROECONOMIC THEOREMS

Any economy, whether free-market, welfare state, or centrally planned, results in an allocation of goods and services to
its consumers.12 Economists use the term "efficient" or "inefficient" to characterize the particular allocation. If, given the existing technology and resource constraints, an alternative to a
particular allocation of goods could be provided that every consumer in the economy would either be neutral towards or prefer to the allocation under scrutiny, then the first allocation is
termed inefficient. Otherwise, it is termed efficient. The alternative allocation might be generated by using different combinations of factors to produce various goods, by producing
different kinds of goods, or by distributing the produced goods
differently.
The distinction between efficient and inefficient allocations
can be clarified by means of a diagram that economists call a
"utility possibility frontier."
Limited only by the economy's resources and existing technology, economists can, in principle, produce almost countless
different allocations of goods. Each consumer in the economy
is assumed capable of comparing the set, or "bundle", of goods
received under one allocation to the set of goods that would be
received in another allocation pattern. A consumer's preference may be discussed more conveniently by assuming that
each consumer assigns a value number ("utility") to each bundle of goods that might be received. If the consumer has no
preference between the bundles, both would receive the same
number. If the consumer prefers one bundle to the other, the
12.

In the interest of simplicity, all references will be to goods alone, sub-

suming services as well. There will be no loss from this simplification.
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preferred bundle would be given a higher number. Because an
economy has limited resources, and because no technology can
produce infinite output from scarce input, the "utility allocations" that an economy can deliver are limited. Indeed, even if
there were only a single consumer, some bundles of goods
would have rankings so high that they could not be delivered
by the economy under consideration. With many consumers,
the utility allocations that could be achieved are similarly
limited.
To illustrate these concepts graphically, consider an imaginary economy occupied by at least two consumers (Persons 1
and 2), both of whom have a set of preferences among the
goods the economy can generate. If each participant is apportioned different fractions of the economy's total resources, for
example, Person 1 gets all the sheep and Person 2 all the butter, and the participants' particular preferences ("indifference
curves") between the goods are known, it can be determined
how they would trade their goods with each other. By going
through extensive variations of these original allocations,
known as "endowments" in the language of microeconomists, a
so-called contract curve can be hypothesized that would show
what the posttrading ownership patterns would look like for
whatever particular endowment was assumed.' 3 To illustrate
100

s,

Sheep

4M

S

Butter in lbs

145

200

Figure 1. Contract Curve
the curve's implications, at point S1 , Person 1 has all the goods
and no trading occurs. Conversely, at S, Person 2 has everything and again no trading occurs. Except for those trivial
cases, the contract curve represents the best bargain that each
13. See J. GOULD & C. FERGUSON, M CROECONObuc THEORY 423-26 (5th ed.
1980). The participants' relative bargaining skills will also influence their
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participant can strike in light of the endowments and preferposttrading outcomes.

To oversimplify, the contract curve represents points of tangency of the
two consumers' utility curves. First, utility curves are constructed for each
consumer. For example, Person l's oversimplified utility map (composite utility curves) might look like this:
sheep

B
A
butter
Person 2's oversimplified utility map might look like this:
sheep

S
R
butter
Next, Person 2's graph is flipped and merged with Person l's graph:
butter
Person 2

R

S

M

M B
A

sheep

butter
Person 1
Next, closely overlapping curves are evaluated. The crosshatched area represents the so-called trading space, within which both consumers are better off
(given some initial endowment), measured in terms of utility, after trading.
The hypothethical point on which the consumers land forms one point (for example, M) on the contract curve. The outcome (M) is one of the points where
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ences of each, and, as such, this bargain is declared efficient by
the microeconomist. Any point off the curve represents a condition in which at least one participant's circumstances can be
improved with no loss to the other participant. Such a condition is inefficient until corrected.
To illustrate one point along the curve, at M Person 1 has
145 pounds of butter and 45 sheep, and Person 2 of course has
the balance of 55 pounds of butter and 55 sheep. The result is
skewed in favor of Person 1, but from the point of view of the
economist, it is efficient.
The exposition is incomplete until the contract curve is
translated into a so-called utility possibility frontier. A utilitypossibility frontier delineates the boundary of the set of utility
allocations that the economy can deliver in light of its resources. Unlike the contract curve, it accounts for decisions relating to the production of goods as well as to their
distribution.14 Consider the case depicted in Figure 2 for the
same simplified two-person, two-product economy:
S,

Utility
Ranking
for Person 2

Utility Ranking for Person 1

S

Figure 2. Utility Possibility Frontier
All utility combinations below S - S are achievable given the
the consumers' indifference curves are tangent to each other that is within the
trading space. Of course, this point is not uniquely determined. The contract
curve itself is the set of possible outcomes of different imaginary trades based
on a great number of differing initial endowments.
14. This discussion avoids the microeconomic analysis of production; noth-

ing is lost by doing so.
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economy's resources and technology, but no utility combination
above that curve can be achieved.
Allocations of goods giving rise to utility allocation below
the curve are inefficient. By way of illustration, consider an
inefficient point such as L or Z. Because there exist points
"northeast" of them, alternative allocations exist that would be
either preferred by all consumers or preferred by some and not
resisted by any.
The simplest two-person economy, with no uncertainty, no
production, no passage of time, etc., results in a utility-possibility curve like that in Figure 2. So does the most complex economy.15 Stated formally, the utility possibility set for an nperson economy (where n is greater than two) is an n-dimensional surface analogous to that in Figure 2. Indeed, Figure 2
can be interpreted as being the set of feasible utility allocations
for two people in an n-person economy when the other n - 2
people are always given allocations of unchanging rank. In
short, Figure 2 is very general, and hence worthy of scrutiny.
An important characteristic of the efficient points in Figure 2 is their abundance; an infinite number of allocations are
efficient. Economists, however, use a synonym for efficiency
that tends to obscure this point. Instead of calling an allocation
"efficient," they call it "Pareto optimal." Economists do not define "optimal" as the unique best, its Latin root notwithstanding. Instead, they mean one of an infinite number of "best"
allocations.
Once it is understood that there are an infinite number of
efficient allocations, the next logical step is to try to find some
way of ranking the efficient points to find the "best" among
them. Such ranking can be done, but only if value judgments
are made about the relative merits of the needs of different
consumers. For example, most people would consider allocation S1 as strikingly inhumane and hence inferior to allocation
M, even though both are efficient. 16 S 1 is Pareto optimal, or
15. See J. GOULD & C. FERGUSON, supra note 14, at 426-27. That text continues with a parallel analysis of production and the eventual equilibrium
struck between production and consumption for a two-person, two-commodity
economy, and, by implication, for much larger economies. Failure to paraphrase those materials does no disservice to the messages of this Commentary.
16. The models assume that the participants in the economy are rational
profit maximizers who do not engage in activities that wantonly destroy each
other's output. The moral assumption that one consumer should not starve
while the other has all the wealth and income is considered too obvious to

dwell on.
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Pareto efficient, because it assigns everything the economy produces to one consumer and consequently no other allocation exists that every other consumer, including the person receiving
all the initial allocation of endowments, prefers or is at least indifferent to. In short, S 1 may be efficient, but it is also scandalously inequitable.
Economists disdain making the "interpersonal comparisons" required to rank efficient allocation. To paraphrase Tom
Lehrer, that is not their department. Politicians are supposed
to make such judgments. Economists view themselves as technicians who can be of no service to politicians if the economists
impose their own values on situations. This seems sensible and
is doubtless well-intentioned. Economists instead direct their
considerable mathematics to determining whether under particular circumstances the allocation of the market economy will
be efficient or inefficient. Circumstances leading to an inefficient market are termed "market failures." One triumph of
modern economics-for which two Nobel prizes have in part
been awarded' 7 -is proof that an efficient allocation results
from laissez faire, provided certain assumptions are met.
REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
For economists to focus on efficiency and to leave interpersonal comparisons to others is appropriate if and only if others
actually make those comparisons. Unfortunately, the political
and legal systems have themselves become entranced with the
economists' notion of efficiency. If none of the people directing
the economists is concerned with equity, and economists refrain
from injecting their own value judgments into their analyses,
equitable judgments will not be made. A rationalization of the
status quo is the likely result.
For example, assume the market economy results in an allocation, like S 1, that is monstrously inequitable. An economist
will pronounce the situation Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal.
The matter may end there, since the "optimal" sounds hard to
beat. The starving consumer, however, or those sensitive to
this consumer's plight, may point out the inequity of the private-market allocation. If this equitable view prevails, then a
scheme to tax the wealthier consumer and redistribute the proceeds to the poorer consumer may be proposed that will result
17. These prizes were awarded to Kenneth J. Arrow (1972) and Gerard
Debreu (1983).
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in a different allocation from the market economy. How will
the economists rate this proposed scheme?
Suppose that the proposed scheme results in point Z in Figure 2 and that, by some ethic, point M would be the best feasible allocation. Since Z is close to M, it would be a highly
desirable allocation, but microeconomists will sincerely declare
it "inefficient" and "suboptimal." In moving from S1 to Z, they
will correctly observe, the tax system has created distortions.
Almost inevitably, therefore, efficient but inequitable allocations tend to persist, even though inefficient but more equitable
allocations exist that those prepared to make interpersonal
comparisons would prefer.
In response to this criticism, thoughtful economists suggest
the obvious solution: transcend the paralyzing conclusion that
a change in favor of equity is inefficient and instead demand
that the extent of the inefficiency be quantified and the conclusions be handed over to policy makers for their final decision.
Unfortunately, economists are often not given this further
mandate, and quantification of the loss from inefficiency may
be far more difficult than the conclusion that a particular
change in policy would be inefficient. Consequently, the economist's conclusion that the change would be inefficient, misunderstood by most, tends to dominate the discussion.
As long as methods of redistribution result in inefficient allocations, the scenario just described rationalizes adherence to
the status quo. Indeed, it is an item of faith among economists
that the problem of inequitable inefficiencies is unavoidable.
The pessimistic syllogism runs as follows. Economists can conceive of redistributive taxes that create no inefficiencies"lump sum taxes," in the jargon of economists.' 8 In theory, a
lump sum tax plus a redistribution could transform allocation
18.

Such a tax would be an instantaneous, unanticipated transmission of

wealth between or among participants, fixed in dollar amount and not influencing pretax behavior. It would depend, among other things, on perfect information and perfect markets, both of which are of course impossible. The
conditions are more complex still because household indifference curves and
firm production curves must be convex. These conditions are an element of
Sen's Converse Theorem, which has been defined as follows:
If household indifference maps and firm production sets are convex, if
there is a full set of markets, if there is perfect information, and if
lump-sum transfers and taxes may be carried out costlessly, then any
Pareto-efficient allocation can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium with appropriate lump-sum transfers and taxes.
A. ATKINSON & J. SrIGurZ, LECTURES ON PuBLIc ECONOMIcS 343 (1980) (emphasis in original).
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S1 into allocation M, and the overall reallocation would be efficient. In fact, however, lump-sum taxes are acknowledged to
be an economic theorist's idealized case, because in practice
every allocation achieved by means of a tax plus a redistribution scheme will create some inefficiencies. At the very least,
some citizens will pour resources into lobbying efforts and
others will take anticipatory actions to reduce their prospective
tax burdens or to increase their prospects for receiving redistributive benefits; any of these activities would render inefficient any redistributive scheme that finally became law.1
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE TAX POLICY
Using this formal definition of efficiency as a guide to tax
policy, it becomes apparent that the remedy for society's emphasis on efficiency is not an idealized tax but a recognition
that such emphasis is misplaced. Interpersonal comparisons
should not be neglected by everyone just because economists
are unwilling to make them. Equity considerations are important and should not take a back seat to the relatively unimportant characteristic of efficiency.
Moreover, the premise that the present system is inherently efficient is insupportable, because the markets are not entirely free, information is lacking and substantial government
intervention in the marketplace already exists. Further, reliable quantification of the adverse effects of intervention is
highly controversial, which should come as no surprise because
the abstractions that have been discussed are just that.
If society is willing to make ethical judgments about alternative allocations, the microeconomists' conclusions about efficiency can be useful for deciding tax policy. Efficiency is a
characteristic possessed both by very good and by very bad allocations. It is true that the best allocation in the economy will
be efficient. Establishing that an initial allocation is inefficient,
therefore, does prove that it is not the best, because an improvement for every consumer is, in principle, possible. Nevertheless, an inefficient allocation may be very good; indeed, it
may be far superior, as determined by societal values, to an efficient allocation. Therefore, the fact that a tax-redistribution
scheme transforms an efficient allocation into an inefficient one
19. There are two qualifications. First, after the redistribution, a new

equilibrium will be struck. Second, substantial inefficiencies, such as lobbying,
occur anyway.
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does not imply that the tax scheme causes harm or that the
inefficiency will be continuous.
The use of efficiency in characterizing contract curves and
formulating utility-possibility frontiers in limited participant
models, as described above, can be carried over into analogous
policy-making theorems for large populations, but real-world
equitable snags quickly appear. This application of efficiency
analysis uses the concept of Pareto optimality to hunt for better
economic policies. Lester Thurow characterizes the associated
problems this way:
Economic theory avoids equity decisions by retreating into what is
called Pareto efficiency-a fancy term for "more is better than less."
If a public program moves the economy from state A to state B, and
in state B everyone is better off than, or as well off as, they were in
state A, then we can say that the public policy is Pareto-efficient and
should be adopted. But since there is always someone who is worse
off after any change, nothing is Pareto-efficient in the real world. As
a result, we retreat farther to the weak form of Pareto efficiency. In
this weak form, state B is Pareto efficient if the economic gainers in
state B could compensate the economics losers in state B so that everyone is as well off or better off. This, of course, is always possible as
long as total resources in state B are larger than in state A. Therefore, any policy that raises the GNP is Pareto-efficient. The problem
in the real world is that the compensation from winners to losers actually has to be paid, yet is almost never paid. As a result, we cannot
avoid making economic equity decisions in public
policies, even
20
though we can eliminate them in economic theory.

So where does this leave the determination of tax policies?
If society is to insist on efficiency in adjusting public policies,
then it must be scrupulous to assure that the principle is not
violated in application and it must deal explicitly and faithfully
with the equity issues entailed. If these efforts are not made,
then the principle of efficiency falls too. As Thurow implies, a
willingness to engage in redistributive activities to achieve a
new Pareto optimum result expands policy-making powers, but
a failure to follow up on the necessary redistribution violates
the rules of efficiency and produces individual unfairnesses. In
sophisticated policy making, therefore, equity confines
efficiency.
Conversely, inefficiency confines equity. Policies can be
20. L. Timyow, THE ZERo SUM SocIETY 218 n.1 (1980) (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the related, and somewhat stunning, proposition that victims of tax reform (for example, homeowners who lose the right to home
mortgage interest deductions) are entitled to guaranteed compensation for
such changes in order to prevent a violation of horizontal equity, see Feldstein,
supra note 2, at 127-28.
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designed that enhance equity but that are inefficient in a static
economy in that at least one person is worse off, as in a shift
from S1 to Z in the earlier example. If an economy expands,
inefficiency does not necessarily follow, but, as Thurow points
out, it virtually always does in fact. As noted above, unless
microeconomic reasoning is to be thrown out of the system of
policy making, the efficiency of a change should be considered.
Analysis should not, however, stop with that observation. Instead, the economist's mandate should be expanded to quantify
the inefficiency, after which the policy makers can, it is hoped,
intelligently evaluate the choices the proposal represents. Such
an expansion is certainly preferable to a mind-deadening conclusion from a noted microeconomist's declaration that the
change is inefficient.

